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Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure
Whenever two or more persons share a common residence and a police
search authorized by one discloses evidence which incriminates another,
a difficult question arises regarding admission of such evidence in
criminal proceedings against the nonconsenting party.1 Although
proper resolution of the third party consent problem raises significant
questions concerning the nature of the protection afforded by the
fourth amendment and the proper scope of the exceptions to the
amendment's warrant requirement,2 the problem itself has received
little critical examination.3 This comment undertakes such an exam-
ination with a view toward reconciling the individual's interest in
remaining free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into his
privacy with society's interest in maintaining order and punishing
criminals. It is suggested here that both interests can be accommodated
by disallowing searches undertaken on the basis of consent by a "third
party" except in those cases when he is actually the agent of the non-
1 The most frequent cases involve a wife's consent that incriminates her husband. See,
e.g., United States v. Pugliese, 155 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Sergio, 21 F.
Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937); In re Lessard, 62 Cal. 2d 497, 399 P.2d 50, 42 Cal. Rptr. 583
(1965); State v. Evans, 45 Hawaii 622, 372 P.2d 365 (1962); People v. Perroni, 14 Ill. 2d
581, 153 N.E.2d 578 (1958); People v. Shambley, 4 IIl. 2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954); Henry
v. State, 154 So. 2d 289 (Miss. 1963); Simmons v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 18, 229 P.2d 615
(1951). For cases involving the consent of one co-tenant incriminating another see, e.g.,
Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1948); Tompkins v. Superior Court, 59 Cal.
2d 65, 378 P.2d 113, 27 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1963); People v. Banks, 47 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1965). A parent's consent to search may incriminate a resident child. E.g., Max-
well v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 944 (1966); Irvin v.
State, 66 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1953); Morris v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky. 349, 208 S.W.2d 58
(1948); State v. Kindermann, 271 Minn. 408, 136 N.W.2d 577 (1965). For examples of a
proprietor's consent to a search which incriminated his guests, see Fredericksen v. United
States, 266 F.2d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Woodward v. United States, 254 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 930 (1958); Calhoun v. United States, 172 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1949);
Idol v. State, 233 Ind. 307, 119 N.E.2d 428 (1954). For an instance in which an agent's
consent to search incriminated his principal, see, e.g., United States v. Antonelli Fire-
works Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946).
2 See text accompanying notes 9-21 infra.
3 Two recent treatments of the problem are Note, 51 Coamu.= LQ. 795 (1966) and
79 HRv. L. REv. 1513 (1966). Also, several recent efforts have involved the specific prob-
lem of spousal consent. See Comment, The Effect of a Wife's Consent to a Search and
Seizure of the Husband's Property, 69 DIcx. L. Rv. 69 (1964); Comment, The Use of
Evidence Obtained During a Search and Seizure Consented to by the Defendant's Spouse,
1964 U. I. L.F. 653.
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consenting party and is empowered to authorize a search on the latter's
behalf or when his interests in authorizing a particular search other-
wise clearly dominate the nonconsenter's interest in privacy.
I. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The aim of the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures4 is to prevent unjustified official invasions of the
privacy of individuals.5 To this end, the reasonableness requirement
of the first clause of the fourth amendment has traditionally been read
in conjunction with the warrant requirement of the amendment's
second clause, which has afforded the needed referent from which the
reasonableness of any search could be initially measured. 6 A search
not authorized by a search warrant is generally held to be unreason-
able unless it falls within one of the well defined exceptions to the
warrant requirement.7 Thus, in its narrowest construction, the right
protected by the fourth amendment is the right, absent exceptional
circumstances, to be free from a warrantless intrusion by the police
into one's privacy.8 The right is personal and extends to one's person,
house, papers, and effects.
Exceptions to the warrant requirement have existed from an early
date because the community's need for effective law enforcement has
militated against the maintenance of an overly strict, prophylactic
4 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 567 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). See generally Beaney, The Constitutional
Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. Rxv. 212; Kaplan, Search and
Seizure: A No Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CALI. L. Rxv. 474 (1961); Reynard,
Freedom From Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class Right?, 25 IND. L.J. 259
(1950). See also text accompanying notes 57-66 infra.
6 See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's discussion of the historical gloss on the fourth amend-
ment in his dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68-86 (1950). Some com-
mentators have suggested that Rabinowitz represented a marked departure from the
general warrant requirement and established the "reasonableness" requirement, with-
out reference to the warrant requirement, as the amendment's focal point. See Comment,
Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U.
CM. L. Rxv. 664, 678-92 (1961). However, subsequent cases clearly indicate that the nor-
mal warrant requirement was not intended to be replaced and that Rabinowitz repre-
sented only an expansion of the exception to the warrant rule involving a search inci-
dent to a valid arrest. See, e.g., cases cited in note 7 infra.
7 See, e.g., Ribs v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960); Weaver v. United States, 295
F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Costner, 217 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
8 A search may be held invalid even when supported by a valid warrant if the search
is conducted in an unreasonable manner. See, e.g., Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346
(1957); Mellet & Nichter Brewing Co. v. United States, 296 Fed. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1923).
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protection. Undoubtedly, pressure for relaxation of the warrant re-
quirement has been especially great since the introduction of the exclu-
sionary rule,9 which, though arguably the only effective method by
which fourth amendment rights can be protected, is a drastic solution,
frequently resulting in freeing criminals in cases of unquestionable
guilt.10 It is therefore not surprising that two of the major exceptions
to the warrant requirement-the search incident to a valid arrest 1
and the search of a motor vehicle when there is probable cause to
believe that it contains the fruits or instrumentalities of crime' 2-
have, over the years, been consistently liberalized.
The rationales underlying these exceptions are highlighted by the
tension between individual rights and the effective enforcement of the
criminal law. Both exceptions are justified primarily by reason of their
necessity.13 The sweeping scope of a permissible search incident to a
valid arrest is also grounded, to some extent, on the usually unarticu-
9 The exclusionary rule, introduced in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
applied only to federal proceedings until Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which held
the rule applicable to the states.
10 See Kaplan, supra note 5.
11 See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). Where the arrest is
merely a pretext to conduct a search, the search may be held illegal. See Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958); McKnight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1948); Henderson v. United States,
12 F.2d 528 (4th Cir. 1926).
12 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
13 Searches incident to a valid arrest are justified by the need of the arresting officer
to protect himself and the necessity of preventing both the escape of the arrestee and
the destruction of evidence. Accordingly, a warrantless search of the arrestee, see, e.g.,
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1957); Simms v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 834
(D.D.C. 1959), and the physical area under his immediate control, see, e.g., Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), are held to be proper. Recently, the permissible
scope of a search incident to a valid arrest has been considerably broadened, and now
includes the entire premises wherein the accused was arrested. Compare CoRNELius,
SEARCH AND SmzuRE 177-80 (2d ed. 1930), with Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781 (9th
Cir. 1959). The present breadth of this exception is suggested by the following comment:
"This exception today is so broad that in great part it swallows up the rule and it
is safe to say that the numbers of searches which are upheld under this exception far
exceed the number where a search warrant has been procured." Kaplan, supra note 5,
at 490. It is clear that the original rationale underlying the exception is inadequate to
support the wide ranging searches undertaken today. For discussion of the need to recon-
cile fourth amendment theory with the practice of courts and the police see Comment,
supra note 6, 28 U. Cur. L. R:v. 664.
The warrantless search of a motor vehicle where there is probable cause to believe
that it contains contraband rests on the recognition that in the time required to secure
a warrant a mobile vehicle can disappear or move into a jurisdiction where the warrant
would be unusable. Hence if there is to be any search at all it must be warrantless.
1966]
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lated notion that to require police to secure a warrant before searching
a premises wherein an arrest is made would be a meaningless require-
ment, since a warrant in such cases would invariably issue as a matter
of form.1 4
Consent to search and seizure, the third principal exception to the
warrant requirement, 15 is predicated on a different rationale. One's
power to consent to a search stems from the long accepted rule that
a person can intelligently and knowingly waive his right to be free
from a warrantless police search. 16 However, since the needs of the
state are minimal where consent to search is sought 7 and since such
consent represents a waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, 8
it is not surprising that courts have not only been quite unwilling to
expand the consent exception,'9 but have, in several cases, severely
restricted it.20
14 For discussion summarizing the arguments for and against this rationale and several
others see Beaney, supra note 5, at 289-40.
15 See, e.g., Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v.
Dornblut, 261 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1958); Woodard v. United States, 254 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.
1958); Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
16 "A defendant cannot claim that his constitutional rights were invaded when an
entry and search of his premises was made with his consent and there is no evidence of
force or coercion." Milyonico v. United States, 53 F.2d 937, 938 (7th Cir. 1931). Accord,
United States v. Ziemer, 291 F.2d 100 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).
Since courts, e.g., Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921), and commentators, e.g.,
Note, Effective Consent to Search and Seizure, 113 U. PA. L Rrv. 260 (1964), speak of con-
sent to search as a "waiver" of fourth amendment rights, the right referred to as being
waived can only be the right to be free from a warrantless police search.
17 It is evident that the great majority of consent searches are undertaken in relatively
non-urgent contexts, in contrast, at least theoretically, to the settings within which
searches grounded on the other two exceptions are carried out.
18 Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
19 The federal courts have been especially strict in demanding that the prosecution
show with clear and convincing evidence that the consent was unaccompanied by any
coercion or duress. See Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960); Judd v.
United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951); United States v. Alberti, 120 F. Supp. 121
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); United States v. Novero, 58 F. Supp. 275 (D.D.C. 1954). The consenting
individual must be informed of the constitutional rights he is waiving. Nusslein v. United
States, 115 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1940); United States v. Festa, 192 F. Supp. 160 (D. Mass.
1960). Courts are qui&k to indulge a presumption of duress when the defendant consented
while in police custody. See, e.g., Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951);
United States v. Wallace, 160 F. Supp. 859 (D.D.C. 1958). A failure to object is not in
itself a valid consent to search. Amos v. United' States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Waldron v.
United States, 219 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See generally Note, supra note 16, 113 U. PA.
L. REv. 260.
20 See, e.g., Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951): "His statements
while in jail, which are relied on as consent, may be summarized as: I have nothing to
hide, you can go there and see for yourself. Conceivably, that is the calm statement of an
innocent man; conceivably again, it is but the false bravado of the small time criminal.
But however it be characterized, it hardly establishes willing agreement that the officers
search the household without first procuring a warrant."
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It is therefore anomalous that the great majority of decisions on the
propriety of third party consent have not reflected this restrictive
view. At first it might appear that what is essentially a vicarious waiver
of a personal constitutional right ought never to be sanctioned, espe-
cially in light of the rationale generally underlying the consent excep-
tion.21 However, courts have fairly consistently upheld searches au-
thorized by a third party when that party has exercised "sufficient
control" over that which was searched or seized.22
Two distinct lines of reasoning underlie these decisions. The first,
based on agency principles, allows the finding that the third party
acts as the agent of the accused and is thus empowered to waive the
latter's constitutional rights. The more common view is simply that
the consenting party acts on his own behalf and waives his own rights
by consenting to a search; the fact that the consent concurrently waives
the constitutional protections of others is a consequence the force of
which is apparently insufficient to proscribe the search.
II. IMPLIED CONSENT AND APPARENT AUTHORITY
The agency theory of implied consent requires the court to infer
from other facts in the case that the implicated party had authorized
the third party to consent to a police search. Typical of this approach
is United States v. Eldridge,2 3 where the defendant loaned his auto-
mobile to an individual who subsequently consented to its search by
the police. The court held that because the defendant had given the
consenting party control of the car and the keys to its trunk, he had
delegated authority to the latter to consent to its search despite evi-
dence indicating that the loan was for a short period of time and a
specific purpose.24
Use of the rhetoric of agency, as illustrated by Eldridge, raises more
21 Some commentators have stated categorically that since fourth amendment rights
are personal, they can be waived only by the individual for whose benefit they are in-
tended. See CORNELUS, SEARCH AND SEizuRE 72 (2d ed. 1930); GROSS, PRIVACY-ITS LEGAL
PROTECTION 76 (1964); SOBEL, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 130
(1964).
22 The Supreme Court has never ruled upon this question. In Amos v. United States,
255 U.S. 313 (1921), the Court expressly avoided deciding whether a wife's consent could
waive the rights of her husband. The decision for the defendant turned on the Court's
inference from the circumstances of the search that the wife's consent had been coerced.
Since then the Court has steadfastly refused to grant certiorari in such a case. For the
Court's most recent rejections see Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 944 (1966); Burge v. United States, 342 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 829 (1965). But cf. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
23 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962).
24 But see State v. Bernius, 177 Ohio St. 155, 203 N.E.2d 241 (1964).
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significant questions than it puts to rest. A cursory review of agency
principles shows that they are generally inapplicable to the situations
within which most search and seizure issues arise. For example, agency
relationships do not exist between the various residents of a dwelling
simply because they live together. To be an agent one must have been
appointed by the principal and be subject to his orders;25 the basis
of the relationship is an agreement between the parties, 26 and although
that agreement may be an implied one, its existence must nonetheless
be supported by sufficient evidence. Agency will generally not be im-
plied unless the alleged agent has been permitted to perform similar
acts or undertake a similar course of dealings in the past.27 Thus, for
courts to hold an authorization binding in many third party consent
circumstances, not only the authority to consent but also the requisite
agency relationship must be inferred from facts which usually do not
support such an inference. It is probably for this reason that several
recent decisions have expressly rejected the agency theory.28 In Stoner
v. California,29 the United States Supreme Court spoke out strongly
against the use of agency fictions in cases involving the waiver of fourth
amendment rights. In reversing the California court's holding that
the consent of a hotel desk clerk properly authorized the police to
search the defendant's room in the hotel, the Court stated: "Our deci-
sions make clear that the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment
are not to be eroded by strained applications of the law of agency or
by unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent authority.' "30
While the particular fiction overturned by the Stoner decision was
more "strained" than that encountered in the more frequent spousal
or joint tenant consent cases, the Court's admonition seems nonethe-
less applicable to the latter situations. The power of a wife or a room-
mate to consent to searches which necessarily invade the privacy of
persons who have not consented stems, if at all, from their possession
and control of the searched premises rather than from the usually un-
25 See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 1, 15 (1933).
26 Ibid. See, e.g., Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927) (concurring opinion);
Barnes v. Royer, 249 App. Div. 877, 292 N.Y.S. 469 (1937).
27 FSTATEMENT, AGENCY § 15 (1933). See Weller v. Speet, 275 Mich. 655, 267 N.W. 758
(1936); Frank v. Board of Education, 90 N.J.L. 273, 100 At. 211 (1917). Agency does not
arise by virtue of the marriage relationship. RESrATFNEMNT, AGENCY § 22; see Meyer v.
Frenkil, 116 Md. 411, 82 At. 208 (1911); Harris v. Smith, 79 Mich. 54, 44 N.W. 169 (1889).
The power of a wife to bind her husband for necessaries which have been furnished is
properly based on principles of restitution, not of agency.
28 See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 980 (1965); People v. Perroni, 14 Ill. 2d 581, 590, 153 N.E.2d 578, 582 (1958).
29 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
30 Id. at 488.
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warranted conclusion that the consenter is an agent of the ultimately
implicated party.
A closely related doctrine that has occasionally been employed to
validate third party consents to search is that of apparent or ostensible
authority. When a person induces a third party to rely upon the ap-
pearance of agency authority in another, he is bound by the actions
of his "agent" when the relying party would otherwise suffer loss.
3
'
Although an actual agency relationship is not required for apparent
authority to be operative, 32 it is necessary to show conduct on the part
of the "principal" which reasonably led the third party to believe that
the agent possessed authority embracing the particular act in question.33
It would seem that at least in cases involving searches of residences,
an inference of apparent authority in the consenting party is unwar-
ranted. The fact that several persons share a common residence should
not be a sufficient basis for finding that each has apparent authority
to consent to searches on behalf of the others. A more fundamental
objection to the employment of the doctrine in the search and seizure
context is that its reason for existence-to prevent a commercial loss
from falling on an innocent party-seems particularly alien to crim-
inal law issues, especially those involving the waiver of rights. Despite
the fact that the state does suffer a "loss," in the sense that it might
not be able to use the seized evidence against the non-consenting party,
if courts seriously "'indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights," 34 the mere appearance
of authority to consent in a third person would appear to be an insuffi-
cient ground for a waiver of another's fourth amendment rights.35
In some situations, however, the consenter is in fact the agent of
the implicated party. These cases arise most frequently in business
31 See, e.g., Masuda v. Kawasaki Dockyard Co., 328 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1964); Windsor
Steel Products, Ltd. v. Whizzer Indus. Inc., 157 F. Supp. 284, 288 (E.D. Mich. 1957), af'd,
261 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1958); Lange v. Curtin, 11 Cal. App. 2d 161, 53 P.2d 185 (1936).
32 See, e.g., Anheuser Busch v. Grovier-Starr Produce Co., 128 F.2d 146, 152 (10th Cir.
1942); Petersen v. Kuhn, 110 Neb. 372, 193 N.W. 756 (1923).
33 See cases cited note 31 supra.
34 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
31; California courts have for years employed a form of the apparent authority doctrine.
Searches and seizures have been held reasonable if the consenter believed he had the
authority to consent and if the police searchers believed the consenter had such au-
thority. By hinging the reasonableness of a search on the subjective beliefs of the con-
senter and the police searchers, a premium is placed on mistake and unawareness. The
leading example of this doctrine is People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955).
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483
(1964), reversing a California judgment based on the apparent authority doctrine which
had upheld the consent of a hotel desk clerk to a police search of a patron's room, casts
considerable doubt on the future of the California doctrine of apparent authority.
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contexts, as when a clerk consents to a search of an office386 or when
an office manager consents to an inspection of a firm's records.37 In
such" cases th6 essential question appears to be whether the scope of
the agent's actual authority includes the right to permit a police search
of that over which the agent is exercising control. When the agent's
powers are general and the principal has entrusted him with significant
duties, it is not unreasonable to assume that the agent is empowered
to deal with the police as his judgment may direct. Thus, in United
States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co.,38 the court's decision that the office
manager had implied authority to permit the police to inspect the
company's records was justifiable in light of the manager's broad super-
visory powers over the records. However, when the agent's authority
is more limited, power to consent to a search should not be inferred.
In Lord v. Kelley,39 the court correctly held that the tax records re-
leased to an Internal Revenue agent by the defendant's accountant
could not be used in criminal proceedings against him because the
accountant's action in releasing the records was "beyond the scope of
[his] actual or apparent authority."40
The several agency rationales employed to sanction third party con-
sents to search are in most cases inadequate to justify the decisions.
Usually the consenter in no sense acts as the agent of the accused.
Furthermore, when the consenting party does act on behalf of the
implicated party, as in the cases involving searches of business prem-
ises, only a general agent with broad powers can realistically be
viewed as having sufficient authority to consent to a search on behalf
of his principal.
III. THE POSSESSION AND CONTROL RULE
The rule most commonly employed to uphold third party consents
to search is that one who has possession and control of premises or
an object may consent to its search and evidence uncovered by that
search may be used against anyone.41 This rule focuses the court's at-
36 See, e.g., United States v. Block, 202 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Hays v. State,
38 Okla. Crim. 331, 261 Pac. 232 (1927).
37 See, e.g., United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946).
38 Ibid.
39 223 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1963), appeal dismissed, 334 F.2d 742 (1st Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965). Accord, Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 230 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. Ohio
1963).
40 223 F. Supp. at 690.
41 See, e.g., United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1954) (consent of business
partner binding on other partner); People v. Perroni, 14 Ill. 2d 581, 153 NY..2d 578
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tention solely on the consenter's relationship to the searched premises.42
Within this framework a comprehensive set of rules to govern third
party consents to search has been built.
It has consistently been held that consent by one who has no right
to possession and control of premises does not render the search of
those premises reasonable and that evidence uncovered by such a
search should be excluded. A landlord cannot consent to a search of
his tenant's apartment43 and a hotelkeeper cannot consent to a search
of his patron's room. 44 Similarly when the consenting party has less
than a complete proprietary or possessory interest in the searched
premises, the implicated party is usually not bound by the consent.
Thus, in Reeves v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary,45 the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the defendant's mother, who, with the defendant, lived
in the home of a relative, was "without authority" to consent to a
police search of defendant's room. Likewise, in People v. Jennings,46
a California court held that a daughter could not consent to a search
of her father's home.
When several persons have co-equal rights to the possession and
control of premises, the prevailing rule is that any one of them may
give consent to a search and the evidence thus disclosed may be used
against anyone.47 The typical situation is a wife's consent to a search
that incriminates her husband. 48 Such searches invariably are defended
on the ground that since consent was given by an individual with
possession and control, the search was reasonable; rarely raised is the
question of the vicarious waiver of the husband's rights. The problem
(1958) (wife's consent binding on husband). Commentators generally accept this position:
"any person having a sufficient level of control over a dwelling should be able to consent
to a search of it." Note, supra note 16, 113 U. PA. L REv. at 273; see Note, 36 TEMP.
L.Q. 95 (1962). But see Comment, supra note 3, 69 Dica. L. REv. 69 (1964).
42 This focus is illustrated in the way courts frame the issue. See, e.g., Roberts v.
United States, 332 F.2d 892, 896-97 (8th Cir. 1964): "This is a question of the wife's own
rights to authorize entry into premises where she lives and of which she had control."
People v. Shambley, 4 II. 2d 38, 43, 122 N.E.2d 172, 174 (1954): "It is clear that in giving
her consent she . . . was acting in her own right as occupant of the premises."
43 E.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); State v. Scrotsky, 39 N.J. 410,
189 A.2d 23 (1963).
44 E.g., Louden v. Utah, 379 US. 1 (1964), reversing per curiam, 15 Utah 2d 64, 387
P.2d 240 (1963); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
45 346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965).
46 142 Cal. App. 2d 160, 298 P.2d 56 (1956). Cf. State v. Bernius, 177 Ohio St. 155, 203
N.E.2d 241 (1964).
47 United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1954) (consent of business partner bind-
ing on other partner); People v. Shambley, 4 Ill. 2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954) (wife's
consent binding on husband).
48 E.g., Sergio v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937); People v. Perroni, 14
Ill. 2d 581, 153 NXE.2d 578 (1958).
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is not limited to cases involving spousal consent. In People v. Banks,49
the defendant's roommate permitted the police to search their room,
and a California court held that an authorization by a joint occupant
constituted a "sufficient justification for entry and search by the
officers."50
When the possessory interest of the consenter is both proprietary
and greater than that of the nonconsenter, the consent is usually held
binding. In Burge v. United States,51 the Ninth Circuit held that the
consent of a lessee of an apartment waived her temporary guest's
right of privacy.52 The Supreme Court of Minnesota recently held
that a father's consent to a search of his twenty-two year old son's
room in the family home rendered the search constitutionally unob-
jectionable. 53
Several courts have modified the impact of the possession and control
rule by holding valid a search and seizure consented to by a third
party only -when that party has exercised possession and control over
the particular area where the evidence was seized or over the object
49 47 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
50 Id. at 500. But cf. Tompkins v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d 65, 878 P.2d 113, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 889 (1963).
51 42 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829 (1965). But ef. United States v.
Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Idol v. State, 233 Ind. 307, 119 N.E.2d 428 (1954).
52 A "house-guest" is entitled to a fourth amendment right of privacy in premises in
which he is residing. However, such has not always been the rule. Prior to the Supreme
Court decision in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), lower federal courts usually
held that individuals had no fourth amendment right of privacy unless they could show
a proprietary or possessory interest in the premises searched. See, e.g., United States v.
Pepe, 247 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Chieppa, 241 F.2d 635 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Ivicola v. United States, 353 U.S. 973 (1957); Gaskins v. United States,
218 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1955); United States v. Eversole, 209 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1954);
Grainger v. United States, 158 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1946); Gibson v. United States, 149
F.2d 381, cert. denied sub nom. O'Kelley v. United States, 326 U.S. 724 (1945); In re
Nassatta, 125 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1942). In Jones, the Court considerably broadened the
scope of the fourth amendment protection by discarding limiting property doctrines and
by holding that anyone "legitimately on the premises" belongs to the class for whose sake
the constitutional protection is given. 362 U.S. at 267. The meaning of the Jones rule
has not been clearly settled. Compare Note, The Exclusionary Rule and the Question of
Standing, 50 GEo. L.J. 585 (1962) with Weeks, Standing To Object in the Field of Search
and Seizure, 6 A=u. L. REV. 65 (1964). However, post-Jones decisions have consistently
indicated that, at the least, anyone residing in a dwelling, including a guest, is protected
by the same fourth amendment right of privacy previously afforded only the traditional
classes of proprietors. For discussions of the fourth amendment rights of temporary
occupants see Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963); Walker v. Peppersack,
316 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1963); United States v. Warden, Rikers Island Penitentiary, 240
F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Blitz, 199 F. Supp. 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
53 State v. Kindermann, 271 Minn. 408, 136 N.W.2d 577 (1965). Accord, Maxwell v.
Stephens, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 944 (1965).
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actually seized. In State v. Evans,54 the Supreme Court of Hawaii held
that a wife who occupied the home jointly with her husband could
not consent to a search which disclosed stolen jewelry hidden in her
husband's cufflink case in his bureau drawer. A similar result was
reached in Holzhey v. United States,55 where the Fifth Circuit held
that the defendant's daughter, who owned the premises where the
defendant resided, could not consent to a search of the latter's locked
personal belongings, notwithstanding the fact that these belongings
were located in an area over which the daughter exercised possession
and control.56
The possession and control rule serves a useful function in separat-
ing out those persons who ought never to be permitted to consent to
a search. It is clear, for example, that a complete stranger cannot prop-
erly authorize the search of one's home. However, beyond this purely
negative function the efficacy of the formula becomes doubtful; the
rule is inadequate as a yardstick for determining the propriety of third
party consents to search chiefly because in operation it omits considera-
tion of interests of all persons other than the consenter. One with
possession and control of a dwelling is, of course, entitled to all the
powers that usually flow from such control and normally this would
include the power to authorize a police search. However, where others
are entitled to constitutional protections in the same areas, it is not
clear that the consenter's power should be permitted to be exercised
freely at the expense of the rights of these others. The rule itself,
without more, does not provide an adequate explanation as to why
the consent of one person should dispel the protection due another.
One explanation of the possession and control rule which would
justify its blanket application in third party consent cases is that the
term "houses" in the fourth amendment relates primarily to the pro-
tection of a property right57 rather than a right of privacy. The pro-
54 45 Hawaii 622, 372 P.2d 365 (1962).
5 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955). See Maxwell v. Stephens, supra note 53, at 338 (dissent-
ing opinion).
56 This modified rule takes considerably more cognizance of interests of persons other
than the consenter than does its broader counterpart. Its principal inadequacy stems from
its ' need to demarcate with some precision particular areas of possession and control.
Should a wife be permitted to consent to a search of her husband's half of the bedroom
closet, used mainly by the husband but in which the wife occasionally places her things
and which she regularly cleans? The administration of such a rule would prove awkward
for both the courts and the police, to whom it would provide a minimum of guidance.
Furthermore, even if the area is clearly defined as one over which the consenter has
possession and control, this should not necessarily be sufficient to validate every third
party consent search. See text accompanying notes 57-82 infra.
57 See Note, Effective Consent to Search and Seizure, 115 U. PA. L. Rv. 260, 273 (1964).
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tection thus afforded aims at barring official trespasses. It follows from
this view that any person whose consent would obviate the possibility
of trespass could give valid permission to enter and search.
Although there seem to be no decisions directly construing the
"houses" terminology of the fourth amendment, a number of factors
suggest that while the fourth amendment certainly is aimed at protect-
ing property rights58 and inhibiting police trespasses, its protections
extend a great deal further. The language consistently used by the
Supreme Court indicates that at the core of the amendment's protec-
tion is the personal right 59 to be free from arbitrary police intrusions
into one's privacy.60 This right extends beyond the aged borders of
property and trespass law;61 although an unreasonable search must
involve a physical intrusion into a protected space, 2 that intrusion
need not constitute a trespass to contravene the amendment.63 If it
were otherwise, the police would be permitted to search premises sim-
ply upon gaining legal entrance; this of course is not the law. The
fourth amendmefit protection against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures is quite clearly a matter distinct from the legality of the searching
officer's presence on the premises. 64
58 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
59 The personal nature of the right is emphasized most frequently in the cases involv-
ing an individual's standing to invoke the exclusionary rule. In order to have standing to
complain of an unreasonable search and seizure, the complainant must allege that the
search violated his personal rights. See note 52 supra, and cases cited therein.
60 The most recent sample of this language is found in Schmerber v. California, 86 Sup.
Ct. 1826, 1834 (1966): "The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State. In Wolf we
recognized '[t]he security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police' as
being 'at the core of the Fourth Amendment' and 'basic to a free society.' 338 U.S. at 27.
We reaffirmed that broad view of the Amendment's purpose in applying the federal
exclusionary rule to the States in Mapp." See Mapp v. Ohio, 567 U.S. 643 (1961).
61 For discussion of the relationship between the law of trespass and property and
the fourth amendment see Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows
on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Car. L. REv. 664, 667-77 (1961).
62 MAGIRE, EVIDENcE OF GUILT 188 (1959).
63 For instances where searches violated fourth amendment rights but could not
support actions in trespass, see Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963);
Walker v. Peppersack, 316 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Warden, Rikers Island
Penitentiary, 240 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Blitz, 199 F. Supp. 826
(E.D.N.Y. 1961). Each of these cases held that the constitutional rights of the defendants
involved could have been infringed by police searches of premises upon which they
were only temporarily located. However, because of their lack of proprietary or possessory
interests in the searched premises, it is doubtful whether any of the defendants could
have maintained an action in trespass. For discussion of the interest necessary to support
an action in trespass see MARTz, Rrrs INCIDENT TO THE POSSESSION OF LAND 36-40 (1954).
64 This point was stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), which involved the permissible scope of a search incident to
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Also tending to undermine the conclusion that the fourth amend-
ment primarily protects a property right are the requirements relating
to a person's standing to object to an allegedly unconstitutional search
and seizure. 65 In Jones v. United States,66 the Supreme Court held that
an individual who was merely "legitimately on the premises" had
standing to object to the search and seizure which led to his conviction,
thus impliedly broadening the protected class to include persons with-
out property interests in the searched premises. Speaking through Mr.
Justice Frankfurter the Court said:
[I]t is unnecessary and ill advised to import into the law sur-
rounding the constitutional right to be free from unreason-
able searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and
refined by the common law in evolving the body of private
property law which, more than almost any other branch of
the law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is
largely historical.67
By providing fourth amendment protections to a class which has no
property interests to protect, the Jones case plainly underscored the
position that the amendment protects a sphere of privacy extending
beyond the limits of one's private property interests.
It is perhaps because of the weakness of the argument that the
fourth amendment is aimed mainly at protecting property rights that
most courts have neither relied on, nor even offered, such a view.
Rather, decisions have frequently been based on common law property
notions relating to the "right" of an owner or a proprietor to permit
the police to enter and search his premises. This appealing line of argu-
ment was employed in two recent cases. In Burge v. United States,6s
where the lessee of an apartment consented, while in police custody,
a valid arrest: "Much is made of the fact that the entry was lawful. But we are not
confined to issues of trespass. The protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to im-
proper searches and seizures quite apart from the legality of an entry." 331 U.S. at 164.
Even where the police are on premises pursuant to a valid search warrant, the officers'
conduct in carrying out the search may be so unreasonable as to invalidate the search.
See Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957) (police removal of entire contents of
searched cabin held unreasonable).
65 See notes 52 & 59 supra.
66 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
67 Id. at 266.
68 342 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829 (1965), reversing 333 F.2d 210 (9th
Cir. 1964). Evidence taken from a bathroom cabinet used jointly by the lessee and her
guest was introduced at the latter's trial. The Ninth Circuit originally held that the
evidence taken from the cabinet could not be used in criminal proceedings against the
guest, Burge v. United States, 333 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1964), but reversed itself on rehearing,
Burge v. United States, 342 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829 (1965).
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to a search that implicated her.temporary guest, the Ninth Circuit
posed the issue somewhat emotionally: "Does the Constitution say that
this lady may lawfully consent to the entrance into her bathroom of
any person in the whole wide world except officers of the government
whose duty it is to enforce that government's laws?" 69 Similarly, but
more calmly, the Supreme Court of Minnesota in State v. Kinder-
mann70 stated that since a father's rights are superior to those of the
children who live in his home, the constitutional protection afforded
the child (who in this case was twenty-two years old) had to be "viewed
in light of the father's right to waive it.1''
The position taken by these courts is compelling in its simplicity.
The ownership of private property includes the right to complete
control of activities and objects on the premises. It is therefore difficult
to avoid the conclusion that these rights of control include an almost
inviolable right to invite the police to search the premises. Posing the
basic issue in this manner suggests that the tension in third party
consent cases is caused not by a conflict between individual rights of
privacy and the needs of state law enforcement but rather by a conflict
between privacy and property rights.
A superficially attractive solution to this conflict would be to hold
consent searches reasonable only as to those persons who actually con-
sented to them. Anyone could thus consent to a search of premises
over which he exercised sufficient possession and control; evidence
uncovered would simply be excluded as to any residents whose consent
was not obtained. However, the solution actually solves nothing be-
cause it does not protect the nonconsenter's interest in privacy and
runs directly counter to the rationale underlying the exclusionary rule;
permitting A to consent to a search that invades B's privacy and there-
after suppressing the evidence against B does nothing to protect
against the invasion of B's privacy. Moreover, the purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule72 is not served by initially approving the search but
thereafter holding it unreasonable and excluding the evidence with
respect to those not consenting.
Rejection of this solution does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that the third party should always be permitted to authorize a search.
For several reasons it appears that the balance of competing interests
69 342 F.2d at 413.
70 271 Minn. 405, 136 N.W.2d 577 (1965).
71 Id. at 410, 136 N.W.2d at 580.
72 The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to assuage the violation of an indi-
vidual's personal rights but to deter unreasonable police conduct. Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949).
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should not be struck in favor of protecting the asserted property rights
of the consenter. First, the property right argument has force only in
those cases where the consenter is an owner or proprietor and the
implicated party-a temporary guest, for example, or a child-has a
lesser interest. Whenever the parties have equal proprietary interests,
as do joint tenants and spouses, it would seem that each person's pow-
ers should be limited by the rights of those with whom the privacy is
shared. In Tompkins v. Superior Court,73 a police search consented
to by one tenant and carried out over the objection of another who
was present, was held unreasonable by the California Supreme Court.
In its opinion the court stated: "A joint occupant's right of privacy
is not completely at the mercy of another with whom he shares legal
possession." 74 While in that case the implicated party was able to voice
his objection to the search while it was being conducted, the court's
reasoning would seem to be equally applicable to the great majority
of cases in which the implicated party is unable, because of his absence,
to make known his objection until after the search is completed. The
right of privacy ought not to depend on so fortuitous a circumstance
as a person's presence on the searched premises. A post-search objection
should be given the same weight as one registered before the search
was undertaken.
Second, even when the consenting party has a greater proprietary
interest in the premises than does the implicated party, it is quite
unrealistic to characterize the consent as the assertion of a property
right. It is rare that the consenter affirmatively desires his premises to
be searched by police officers.75 It would appear that in the great ma-
jority of consensual searches the consenter is indifferent or acquiescent.
Such an attitude is far removed from that vividly portrayed in the
Burge decision;76 its prevalence reduces the importance of the asserted
conflict between the nonconsenter's interest in privacy and the con-
senter's property rights, and may question even the existence of such
a conflict. If the consenter is not actually demanding or even request-
ing that his house be searched, must the consent conflict with the non-
consenter's interests? It appears that it does not and that the police,
by postponing their search until the consent of all affected parties is
obtained, might easily dispel any possibility of conflict.77
73 59 Cal. 2d 65, 378 P.2d 113, 27 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1963).
74 Id. at 69, 378 P.2d at 116, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
75 See Note, supra note 57, at 260.
76 For a more pointed statement of this position, see the dissenting opinion in the
court's earlier disposition of the case. Burge v. United States, 333 F.2d 210, 219-21 (9th
Cir. 1964).
77 Of course, when the owner demands or requests that the police search, the conflict
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It can now be suggested that a proper solution to the third party
consent problem would require personal consent by the implicated
party before the evidence obtained could be used against him. In posi-
tive terms, such a rule would require that the police obtain the consent
of all parties whose privacy a proposed search would invade before
conducting the search.78
A solution requiring such individual consent is, of course, not free
from difficulty. It would not completely resolve the problems posed in
those cases when the consenting party affirmatively requests the police
to search his premises.79 Moreover, the difficulties presented when the
object searched is personalty rather than a dwelling are not completely
obviated by such a rule. These cases arise when the implicated party
has given the consenting party possession of an object such as an auto-
mobile or a briefcase.80
Another problem may arise from a rule requiring the consent of
every party whose privacy a particular search would invade. If A con-
sents to a search that incriminates him can he thereafter object to the
search on the ground that it was unreasonable because B's consent was
not obtained? In such a circumstance, it would appear that A's consent
will at least make the search reasonable as to him; since he consented,
his personal rights were not violated by the search.8' Moreover, practi-
cally all jurisdictions would not permit A to object to a search on the
ground that it violated the rights of another.8 2 California appears to
be the only jurisdiction that gives an individual standing to object to
a search that violated another's rights.8 3 However, although the con-
senter may be given standing to object to the search, it does not follow
is extant. For a case where the police'were so called upon to search see Woodard v.
United States, 254 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 930 (1958).
78 Cf. United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (affirming suppression of
evidence taken from the defendant's desk pursuant to a search consented to by her
employer); Idol v. State, 233 Ind. 307, 119 N.E.2d 428 (1954) (caretaker of a garage who
permitted the defendant to store his automobile in it could not validly consent to a
search of the garage and an examination of the defendant's automobile).
79 See Woodard v. United States, supra note 77. Even in the cases where the pro-
prietor requests a police search it is not clear that the search ought to be made without
the consent of others whose privacy will be invaded or without a warrant. Perhaps a
proper solution to this problem can be found in the nature of the relationships between
the concerned parties themselves, and between the concerned parties and the searched
premises. For example, it might be more appropriate to allow the search where the
nonconsenting party is merely a weekend guest than where he is a permanent resident.
80 See, e.g., Sartain v. United States, 303 F.2d 859 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 894
(1962); United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962).
81 See note 16 supra.
82 See notes 59 and 52 supra.
83 E.g., People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
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that the evidence thus obtained must be suppressed. The consent in
such a case may be taken as equivalent to a general waiver of any ob-
jection to the search and treated like an untimely objection. While
this position is not completely consistent with the rationale under-
lying California's standing rule, it appears more acceptable than the
alternative, which permits an individual to contest the reasonableness
of a search after he has freely and intelligently consented to it, arid
thereby to gamble on its outcome.
IV. CONCLUSION
The rule proposed in this comment, if given effect, will have a some-
what restrictive effect on police power to search. That the police are
restricted, however, does not seem to be a particularly compelling ob-
jection to the proposal. If the required consenters cannot be found or
will not consent, the ready alternative is the search warrant. It should
be recalled that all consent searches are non-urgent exceptions to the
warrant requirement, 4 and that courts continually extol the desirabil-
ity of requiring officers to seek a warrant before conducting a search.8 5
Therefore, it does not seem to impose too serious a burden on the
police to require that they secure a warrant when the consent of all
persons who are to be searched cannot be obtained. The consequences
of such a requirement ought neither to impede effective enforcement
of the law nor adversely affect an orderly society.
84 See text accompanying notes 15-20 supra.
85 E.g., Mr. Justice Jackson's statement in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948):
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is
not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime . . . . When the
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided
by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id. at 13-14.
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